IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT
CHANDIGARH
CRR 151 of
2025 (O&M)
Date of
Decision: 10.03.2025
Jugjit Kaur
...Petitioner
Versus
Rajwinder Singh ...
Respondent
CORAM : HON'BLE
MR. JUSTICE N.S.SHEKHAWAT
Present : Mr. A.P.S.Deol,
Senior Advocate with
Mr.
Himmat Singh Deol, Advocate
for the
petitioner.
Mr. J.S.
Mehndiratta, Advocate/Amicus Curiae and
Mr.
P.K.S. Phoolka, Advocate
for the
respondent.
N.S.SHEKHAWAT, J. (Oral)
1. The petitioner has filed the present revision petition
against the impugned judgment dated 09.01.2025 passed by the Court of
Additional Sessions Judge, Bathinda and judgment and order dated 25.10.2017
passed by the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Bathinda, whereby, the petitioner
has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Act') and
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay
a fine of Rs. 10,000/-. In default of payment of fine, she would further
undergo 1 of 20 Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:033187 CRR 151 of 2025 (O&M)
-2- rigorous imprisonment for two months. However, no compensation has been
awarded to the respondent/complainant in the present case.
2. The brief facts, as highlighted in the complaint before
the trial Court were that petitioner and her husband had close family relations
with the respondent/complainant and out of need of money for the business
purposes, petitioner, being Sole Prop. of M/s. Matharu Agro Industries,
borrowed a sum of Rs.19,00,000/- in cash from the respondent about six months
ago in the presence of Desa Singh son of Jawala Singh and Balwinder Singh son
of Pal Singh, residents of village Dialpura, Distt. Bathinda and at the time of
borrowing the said amount, petitioner had agreed to repay the said amount to
the respondent within the period of six months and also issued a post dated
cheque No.030622 dated 02.04.2015 for a sum of Rs.19,00,000/- in favour of the
respondent from her account maintained by the petitioner with State bank of
Patiala, Goniana Mandi in the presence of aforesaid witnesses and at the time
of issuance of cheque in question, petitioner had assured the respondent that
the said cheque will be honoured as and when the same is presented for
encashment on the due date. Bonafidely believing the assurance of the
petitioner, respondent accepted the said cheque and since the accused did not
repay the said amount of Rs.19,00,000/- to respondent within the period of six
months, as such the respondent, after informing the petitioner, presented the
said cheque in his account 2 of 20 Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:033187 CRR
151 of 2025 (O&M) -3- with HDFC Bank, Goniana for encashment and the banker
of the respondent further sent the said cheque to banker of the petitioner for
clearance but the said cheque remained dishonoured and the same had been
returned by the banker of the petitioner to the banker of the respondent along
with cheque returning memo dated 03.04.2015 with remarks 'Account Closed'.
After the receipt of the dishonoured cheque and memo, respondent got issued a
legal notice dated 15.04.2015 posted on 17.04.2015 upon the petitioner through
his counsel intimating the petitioner about the dishonour of the cheque and
recalling to make the payment but the petitioner failed to make the payment of
dishonoured cheque.
3. After completion of the trial, the petitioner was held
guilty for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the
Act. However, while awarding the sentence, the petitioner was ordered to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years, but was directed to
pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- only and in default of payment of fine, she would
further undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two months only and no
compensation was awarded to the respondent. The petitioner/accused filed an
appeal before the Court of District and Sessions Judge, Bathinda and the
appellate Court/Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Bathinda, upheld the
judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court.
Challenging the impugned judgment, the petitioner/accused
preferred present revision petition before this Court.
4. After the issuance of the notice, the respondent did not
appear before the Court despite service. Consequently, Mr. J.S. Mehndiratta,
Advocate, was appointed as Amicus Curiae to assist the Court on behalf of
respondent. Later on, Mr. P.K.S. Phoolka, Advocate, also appeared to represent
the respondent and he was also heard by the Court. During the course of hearing
of the matter, this Court had noticed that the prosecution in the present case
was launched by the respondent/complainant for the dishonour of a cheque of Rs.
19,00,000/-, which was issued by the petitioner ten years ago on 02nd April,
2015. However, while awarding the sentence, the trial Court had directed the
petitioner to pay a meager sum of Rs. 10,000/- only as fine and no amount of
compensation was awarded to the respondent/complainant. Since, this Court felt
that the trial Court should have exercised its discretion to impose fine and to
order payment of compensation to the respondent, learned counsel for the
parties were heard on the issue of awarding of adequate amount of compensation
in view of the provisions of Section 138 read with Section 142 of the Act.
5. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner and
perused the record, the only question that begs determination in this case is what
should be the approach of the trial Court while awarding 4 of 20 Neutral
Citation No:=2025:PHHC:033187 CRR 151 of 2025 (O&M) -5- punishment to an
accused convicted for commission of offence under Section 138 of the Act;
whether the trial Court should, with or without the punishment of imprisonment,
impose fine which is sufficient enough to meet the liability of the accused
towards the complainant as represented by the bounced cheque ?.
6. With a view to appreciate the issue raised by learned
counsel for the petitioner, it is necessary to first set out Section 138 of the
Act.
"138.
Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account. --Where
any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for
payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for
the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned
by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the
credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds
the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that
bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall,
without prejudice to any other provisions of this Act, be punished with
imprisonment for a term which may be extended to two years, or with fine which
may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:
Provided that
nothing contained in this section shall apply unless—
(a) the cheque has
been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which
it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;
(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as
the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by
giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque within thirty days of
the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the
cheque as unpaid; and,
(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of
the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in
due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said
notice. Explanation- For the purposes of this section, "debt or other
liability" means a legally enforceable debt or other liability".
7. As is apparent from a bare reading of Section 138 of the
Act reproduced above, the Criminal Court after convicting the accused, is
empowered to impose punishment of imprisonment for a term, which may extend to
two years, or fine which may extend to twice the amount of cheque, or both. The
trial Court is, thus, given the discretion to impose the sentence of
imprisonment or fine or both.
8. That from a perusal of the provisions of Section 138 of
the Act, it is apparent that the trial Court is empowered to award the
imprisonment for a term, which may extend to two years or fine, which may
extend to twice the amount of cheque or both. Thus, the trial Court was granted
the discretion to impose the sentence of 6 of 20 Neutral Citation
No:=2025:PHHC:033187 CRR 151 of 2025 (O&M) -7- imprisonment or fine or
both. Still further, while exercising this discretion, the trial Court must put
in mind the object of the enactment, i.e., Negotiable Instruments Act,
particularly the object of engrafting the provisions of Section 138 of the Act
on the statute book. The prime object of enacting Chapter XVII, which was
inserted in the Act by way of Act No. 66 of 1988 was to control and discourage
the menace of cheque bouncing in the course of commercial transactions and to
encourage the culture of use of cheques and enhancing the credibility of the
instrument. The observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of
Damoder S. Prabhu vs Sayed Babalal H. (2010) 5 SCC 663 are reproduced as under:
"3. However,
there are some larger issues which can be appropriately addressed in the
context of the present case. It may be recalled that Chapter XVII comprising
Sections 138 to 142 was inserted into the Act by the Banking, Public Financial
Institutions and Negotiable Instruments Laws (Amendment) Act, 1988 (66 of
1988). The object of bringing Section 138 into the statute was to inculcate
faith in the efficacy of banking operations and credibility in transacting
business on negotiable instruments. It was to enhance the acceptability of
cheques in settlement of liabilities by making the drawer liable for penalties
in case of bouncing of cheques due to insufficient arrangements made by the
drawer, with adequate safeguards to prevent harassment of honest drawers. If
the cheque is dishonoured for insufficiency of
7 of 20 Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:033187 CRR 151 of 2025
(O&M) -8- funds in the drawer's account or if it exceeds the amount
arranged to be paid from that account, the drawer is to be punished with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may
extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both"
"4 It may be
noted that when the offence was inserted in the statute in 1988, it carried the
provision for imprisonment up to one year, which was revised to two years
following the amendment to the Act in 2002. It is quite evident that the
legislative intent was to provide a strong criminal remedy in order to deter
the worryingly high incidence of dishonour of cheques. While the possibility of
imprisonment up to two years provides a remedy of a punitive nature, the
provision for imposing a fine which may extend to twice the amount of the
cheque serves a compensatory purpose. What must be remembered is that the dishonour
of a cheque can be best described as a regulatory offence that has been created
to serve the public interest in ensuring the reliability of these instruments.
The impact of this offence is usually confined to the private parties involved
in commercial transactions".
9. Later in paragraphs (17) and 18 of the said judgment, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court, referring to recently published commentary on the topic
of Section 138 of N.I. Act, made very apt observations. It was noticed by the
Hon'ble Supreme that unlike other forms of crime, the punishment for commission
of offence under Section 138 of the Act is not a means of seeking retribution,
but is more a means to ensure payment of money and, therefore, in respect of
offence of 8 of 20 Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:033187 CRR 151 of 2025
(O&M) -9- dishonor of cheques, it is the compensatory aspect of the remedy
which should be given priority over the punitive aspect. For ready reference,
the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraphs (17) and (18) are
reproduced:
"17. In a
recently published commentary, the following observations have been made with
regard to the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act. Unlike that for
other forms of crime, the punishment here (in so far as the complainant is
concerned) is not a means of seeking retribution, but is more a means to ensure
payment of money. The complainant's interest lies primarily in recovering the
money rather than seeing the drawer of the cheque in jail. The threat of jail
is only a mode to ensure recovery. As against the accused who is willing to
undergo a jail term, there is little available as remedy for the holder of the
cheque. If we were to examine the number of complaints filed which were
`compromised' or `settled' before the final judgment on one side and the cases
which proceeded to judgment and conviction on the other, we will find that the
bulk was settled and only a miniscule number continued."
18 It is quite obvious that with respect to the offence of
dishonour of cheques, it is the compensatory aspect of the remedy which should
be given priority over the punitive aspect. There is also some support for the
apprehensions raised by the learned Attorney General that a majority of cheque
bounce cases are indeed being compromised or settled by way of compounding,
albeit during the later stages of litigation thereby contributing to undue
delay in justice- delivery. The problem herein is 9 of 20 Neutral Citation
No:=2025:PHHC:033187 CRR 151 of 2025 (O&M) -10- with the tendency of
litigants to belatedly choose compounding as a means to resolve their dispute.
Furthermore, the written submissions filed on behalf of the learned Attorney
General have stressed on the fact that unlike Section 320 of the CrPC, Section
147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act provides no explicit guidance as to what
stage compounding can or cannot be done and whether compounding can be done at
the instance of the complainant or with the leave of the court"
10. Similarly in the matter of Somnath Sarkar vs Utpal Basu
Mallick and another, (2013) 16 SCC 465, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while
considering the issue in paragraph (15) has summed up its observations in the
following manner:
15........ Suffice
it to say that the High Court was competent on a plain reading of Section 138
to impose a sentence of fine only upon the appellant.. Inasmuch as the High
Court did so, it committed no jurisdictional error....."
11. The Hon'ble Jammu and Kashmir High Court in the case of
Abdul Hamid Mir Vs. Tariq Ahmad Khan (561-A Cr.P.C. No. 124/2015, decided on
20.02.2018) has also made the similar observations.
12. From a reading of provisions of Section 138 of the Act in
the context of laudable object sought to be achieved by Chapter XVII of the
Act, it is abundantly clear that the Criminal Court while convicting an accused
for commission of offence under Section 138 10 of 20 Neutral Citation
No:=2025:PHHC:033187 CRR 151 of 2025 (O&M) -11- of the Act, cannot ignore
the compensatory aspect of remedy and the compensatory aspect can only be given
due regard if the sentence imposed is at least commensurate to the amount of
cheque, if not more, so that this fine, once imposed, can be appropriated
towards payment of compensation to the complainant by having resort to Section
357 of Cr.P.C. Before I proceed, it would be appropriate to set out the
provisions of Section 357 as well.
"357. Order to
pay compensation-(1) When a Court imposes a sentence of fine or a sentence
(including a sentence of death) of which fine forms a part, the Court may, when
passing judgment, order the whole or any part of the fine recovered to be
applied:-
(a) in defraying
the expenses properly incurred in the prosecution;
(b) in the payment
to any person of compensation for any loss or injury caused by the offence,
when compensation is, in the opinion of the Court, recoverable by such person
in a Civil Court;
(c) when any person
is convicted of any offence for having caused the death of another person or of
having abetted the commission of such an offence, in paying compensation to the
persons who are, under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 (13 of 1855), entitled to
recover damages from the person sentenced for the loss resulting to them from
such death;
(d) when any person
is convicted of any offence which includes theft, criminal misappropriation,
criminal breach of trust, or cheating, or of having dishonestly
11 of 20 Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:033187 CRR 151 of
2025 (O&M) -12- received or retained, or of having voluntarily assisted in
disposing of, stolen property knowing or having reason to believe the same to
be stolen, in compensating any bona fide purchaser of such property for the
loss of the same if such property is restored to the possession of the person
entitled thereto.
(2) If the fine is imposed in a case which is subject to
appeal, no such payment shall be made before the period allowed for presenting
the appeal has elapsed, or, if an appeal be presented, before the decision of
the appeal. (3) When a Court imposes a sentence, of which fine does not form a
part, the Court may, when passing judgment, order the accused person to pay, by
way of compensation, such amount as may be specified in the order to the person
who has suffered any loss or injury by reason of the act for which the accused
person has been so sentenced.
(4) An order under this section may also be made by an
Appellate Court or by the High Court or Court of Session when exercising its
powers of revision. (5) At the time of awarding compensation in any subsequent
civil suit relating to the same matter, the Court shall take into account any
sum paid or recovered as compensation under this section".
13. Even, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has held in the
matter of Suganthi Suresh Kumar Vs. Jagdeeshan 2002(2) SCC 420 that the object
of Section 138 of the Act is not only punitive, but compensatory as well. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court clearly held that 12 of 20 Neutral Citation
No:=2025:PHHC:033187 CRR 151 of 2025 (O&M) -13- the compensatory aspect
must receive priority over the punitive aspect of Section 138 of the Act and
the held as follows:-
"The total
amount covered by the cheques involved in the present two cases was Rs.
4,50,000. There is no case for the respondent that the said amount had been
paid either during the pendency of the cases before the trial court or revision
before the High Court or this Court. If the amounts had been paid to the
complainant there perhaps would have been justification for imposing a
flee-bite sentence as had been chosen by the trial court. But in a case where
the amount covered by the cheque remained unpaid it should be the look out of
the trial Magistrates that the sentence for the offence under Section 138
should be of such a nature as to give proper effect to the object of the
legislation. No drawer of the cheque can be allowed to take dishonour of the
cheque issued by him light heartedly. The very object of enactment of
provisions like Section 138 of the Act would stand defeated if the sentence is
of the nature passed by the trial Magistrate. It is a different matter if the
accused paid the amount at least during the pendency of the case"
14. In a later case of R. Vijayan vs Baby & Anr, (2012) 1
SCC 260, their Lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court culled out the following
principle from the provisions of Chapter XVII of the Act which states as under:
"The provision
for levy of fine which is linked to the cheque amount and may extend to twice
the amount of the cheque (section 138) thereby rendering section 13 of 20
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:033187 CRR 151 of 2025 (O&M) -14- 357(3)
virtually infructuous in so far as cheque dishonour cases are concerned".
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the later part of the said
judgment while alluding to the intention of the Legislature for enacting
Section 138 held thus:
"17. The
apparent intention is to ensure that not only the offender is punished, but
also ensure that the complainant invariably receives the amount of the cheque
by way of compensation under section 357(1)(b) of the Code. Though a complaint
under section 138 of the Act is in regard to criminal liability for the offence
of dishonouring the cheque and not for the recovery of the cheque amount,
(which strictly speaking, has to be enforced by a civil suit), in practice once
the criminal complaint is lodged under section 138 of the Act, a civil suit is
seldom filed to recover the amount of the cheque. This is because of the
provision enabling the court to levy a fine linked to the cheque amount and the
usual direction in such cases is for payment as compensation, the cheque
amount, as loss incurred by the complainant on account of dishonour of cheque,
under section 357 (1)
(b) of the Code and
the provision for compounding the offences under section 138 of the Act. Most
of the cases (except those where liability is denied) get compounded at one
stage or the other by payment of the cheque amount with or without interest.
Even where the offence is not compounded, the courts tend to direct payment of
compensation equal to the cheque amount (or even something more towards
interest) by levying a fine commensurate with the cheque amount. A stage has 14
of 20 Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:033187 CRR 151 of 2025 (O&M) -15-
reached when most of the complainants, in particular the
financing institutions (particularly private financiers) view the proceedings
under section 138 of the Act, as a proceeding for the recovery of the cheque
amount, the punishment of the drawer of the cheque for the offence of
dishonour, becoming secondary".
"18. Having
reached that stage, if some Magistrates go by the traditional view that the
criminal proceedings are for imposing punishment on the accused, either
imprisonment or fine or both, and there is no need to compensate the
complainant, particularly if the complainant is not a `victim' in the real
sense, but is a well-to- do financier or financing institution, difficulties
and complications arise. In those cases where the discretion to direct payment
of compensation is not exercised, it causes considerable difficulty to the
complainant, as invariably, by the time the criminal case is decided, the
limitation for filing civil cases would have expired. As the provisions of
Chapter XVII of the Act strongly lean towards grant of reimbursement of the
loss by way of compensation, the courts should, unless there are special
circumstances, in all cases of conviction, uniformly exercise the power to levy
fine upto twice the cheque amount (keeping in view the cheque amount and the
simple interest thereon at 9% per annum as the reasonable quantum of loss) and
direct payment of such amount as compensation. Direction to pay compensation by
way of restitution in regard to the loss on account of dishonour of the cheque
should be practical and realistic, which would mean not only the payment of the
cheque amount but interest thereon at a reasonable rate.
15 of 20 Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:033187 CRR 151 of
2025 (O&M) -16- Uniformity and consistency in deciding similar cases by
different courts, not only increase the credibility of cheque as a negotiable
instrument, but also the credibility of courts of justice".
"19. We are
conscious of the fact that proceedings under section 138 of the Act cannot be
treated as civil suits for recovery of the cheque amount with interest. We are
also conscious of the fact that compensation awarded under section 357(1)(b) is
not intended to be an elaborate exercise taking note of interest etc. Our
observations are necessitated due to the need to have uniformity and
consistency in decision making. In same type of cheque dishonour cases, after
convicting the accused, if some courts grant compensation and if some other
courts do not grant compensation, the inconsistency, though perfectly
acceptable in the eye of law, will give rise to certain amount of uncertainty
in the minds of litigants about the functioning of courts. Citizens will not be
able to arrange or regulate their affairs in a proper manner as they will not
know whether they should simultaneously file a civil suit or not. The problem
is aggravated having regard to the fact that in spite of section 143(3) of the
Act requiring the complaints in regard to cheque dishonour cases under section
138 of the Act to be concluded within six months from the date of the filing of
the complaint, such cases seldom reach finality before three or four years let
alone six months. These cases give rise to complications where civil suits have
not been filed within three years on account of the pendency of the criminal
cases. While it is not the duty of criminal courts to ensure that successful
complainants
16 of 20 Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:033187 CRR 151 of
2025 (O&M) -17- get the cheque amount also, it is their duty to have
uniformity and consistency, with other courts dealing with similar cases."
15. Still further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of
Bir Singh Vs. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197 expressed its anguish that some
Magistrates went by the traditional view, that the criminal proceedings were
for imposing punishment and did not exercise discretion to direct payment of
compensation, causing considerable difficulty to the complainant, as invariably
the limitation for filing civil cases would expire by the time, the criminal
case was decided. Even, this Court has no hesitation to hold that while
imposing sentence under Section 138 of the Act, the Court should exercise its
discretion in imposing fine by having regard to Section 357(3) of Cr.P.C.
Rather, the Criminal Court should bear in the mind the laudable object of
engrafting Chapter XVII containing Section 138 to 142 of the Act and give
priority to compensatory aspect of remedy.
16. Indisputably, the Legislature has given discretion to the
Magistrate to impose a sentence of fine which may extend to double the amount
of cheque and, therefore, the sentence of fine whenever imposed by the Criminal
Court upon conviction of accused under Section 138 of the Act must be
sufficient enough to adequately compensate the complainant. The amount of
cheque and the date from which the amount under the cheque has become payable
along with 17 of 20 Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:033187 CRR 151 of 2025
(O&M) -18- payment of reasonable interest may serve as good guide in this
regard. To be consistent and uniform, it is always advisable to impose a fine
equivalent to the amount of cheque plus at least 6% interest per annum from the
date of cheque till the date of judgment of conviction. However, before
inflicting such fine, the trial Magistrate must eschew the amount of interim
compensation, if any, paid under Section 143A of the Act or such other sum
which the accused might have paid during the trial or otherwise towards
discharge of liability. It may or may not accompany the sentence of simple
imprisonment. It is purely in the discretion of the trial Magistrate but having
regarding to the object of legislation, it shall be appropriate if the sentence
of imprisonment imposed is kept at the minimum unless, of course, the conduct
of accused demands otherwise.
17. In the present case also, it is apparent that the trial
Court has miserably failed to take into account the peculiar facts of the
present case and has imposed a fine of Rs.10,000/- only under Section 138 of
the Act and in default of payment of fine, the petitioner/accused had been
directed to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two months
and no amount of compensation was awarded. Thus, the respondent, who was the
complainant before the trial Court had even been deprived of an amount of
Rs.19,00,000/-, which had become payable to him on 02.04.2015, i.e., about 10
years ago.
18. Consequently, the present revision petition is allowed
and the impugned judgment passed by the appellate Court, i.e., the Court of Sh.
Mahesh Grover, Additional Sessions Judge, Bathinda and the order on quantum of
sentence dated 25.10.2017 passed by the Court of Rajbinder Kaur, Judicial
Magistrate 1st Class, Bathinda, are set-aside and the matter is remanded back
to the trial Court for considering the imposition of sentence on the present
petitioner, de- novo, in the light of the legal preposition discussed and the observations
made hereinabove.
19. Needless to observe that the trial Court shall hear the
parties afresh, before imposing the sentence on the petitioner.
20. Since, the petitioner is in custody, she shall be
released on bail on her furnishing bail bonds/surety bonds to the satisfaction
of the learned trial Court/Duty Magistrate/CJM concerned till the passing of
order on quantum of sentence by the trial Court and, thereafter, the trial
Court shall proceed in accordance with law.
21. Before parting with the judgment, this Court places on
record its deep appreciation for Mr. J.S. Mehndiratta, learned Amicus Curiae,
who had rendered able assistance to the Court.
22. Apart from this, I deem it appropriate to direct the
Registrar General of this Court to circulate this judgment to all the judicial
officers, subject to the jurisdiction of this Court, so that the uniformity and
inconsistency in the matter of imposing the sentence 19 of 20 Neutral Citation
No:=2025:PHHC:033187 CRR 151 of 2025 (O&M) -20- of fine having regard to
the compensatory aspect of the remedy under Section 138 of the Act is ensured.
23. All pending applications, if any, are disposed off,
accordingly.
10.03.2025 (N.S.SHEKHAWAT)
amit rana JUDGE
Whether reasoned/speaking : Yes/No
Whether reportable :
Yes/No
